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Why Proving Defendant's Motive With the
Victim's State of Mind Sometimes Makes
Sense... Despite What Missouri Says
State v. Revelle'

I. INTRODUCTION
In a case with facts sensational enough to attract the attention of NBC's
Dateline,lies a complicated legal analysis of Missouri's "present state of mind"
exception to the hearsay rule. This Note traces the development and scope of the
exception as it applies to homicide victims' declarations. After highlighting the
conflicting approaches taken across the nation and within Missouri itself, this
Note will argue that Missouri courts should acknowledge that evidence of a
victim's present state of mind can be relevant to prove a defendant's motive
when the victim communicates his or her state of mind to the defendant.
Furthermore, in the instant case, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern
District could have found that the disputed evidence was inadmissible based on
its legal relevancy rather than by illogically applying the present state of mind
exception to the hearsay rule.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Defendant George Revelle (hereinafter "Defendant"), a Missouri banker,
was found guilty of first-degree murder for the death of his wife, Lisa.2 When

1. 957 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
2. Id. at 430. A jury found that the defendant became "hopelessly in debt" after
embezzling funds from both his employer, Ozark Bank, and from the City of Fremont
Hills, for which he served as mayor. Id. Three months before Lisa's death, George took
out insurance on her life in the amount of $500,000 with a double indemnity clause. Id.
George was the sole beneficiary. Id. Within the last three months of Lisa's life, George
had talked to various people several times about getting a firearm for "home defense."
Id. George was assured by friends that a .45 caliber gun would do the trick. Id.
In the middle of the night on September 27, 1994, George called the police to check
out his family's home after the motion detector lights on the side of the house had been
activated. Id. The inspecting officer found no sign of anyone near the home. Id. George
went to work later that day and told his co-workers about the activated lights and that "he
would keep his shotgun close that night." Id.
The next morning around 5 a.m., police officers were again dispatched to the
Revelle residence. Id. The officers found George in the garage, talking on a cellular
phone, claiming: "'They shot my wife."' Id. at 431. Lisa was killed by a .45 caliber gun
shot wound to the head. Id. The officers noted that the motion detector lights had not
been activated that morning, that there were no dogs barking in the neighborhood, that
there were no footprints around the home and that there were no unusual cars or people
in the area. Id.
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faced with criminal charges, Defendant denied that he shot his wife.3 A
Christian County Circuit Court jury found otherwise and sentenced Defendant
to life imprisonment.4
Defendant appealed his conviction on various grounds, but the Missouri
Court of Appeals for the Southern District examined only two of his arguments.
The first argument was that the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict of
guilty. The second argument was that it was reversible error to admit into
evidence a hearsay note written by the victim before her death.' As for the first
claim of insufficient evidence, the appellate court summarized the facts at trial
and concluded not only that Defendant had a monetary motive to kill his wife,
but also that the facts were "consistent with each other, consistent with guilt, and
inconsistent with any reasonable theory of innocence." 6
The appellate court spent a significantly longer time, however, dealing with
Defendant's hearsay argument. During the State's case-in-chief, the trial court
admitted into evidence a note that the victim wrote to Defendant possibly six
months prior to her death.' Defendant objected to its admission, claiming it was
inadmissible hearsay! The State conceded it was hearsay, but argued it was
admissible hearsay under the "present state of mind exception."9 The note
expressed, among other things, the victim's fear of Defendant, her frustration
with their marriage and her dissatisfaction with his continuous desire for
material objects.'0 The trial court, focusing on the relevancy and the timeliness

3.Id. at 432.
4. Revelle, 957 S.W.2d at 430.
5. Id.
6.Id. at 431. The court said it only needed to find "sufficient evidence from which
reasonable jurors could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
at 430 (citing State v. Dulany, 781 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Mo. 1989)).
7. Id. The exact date the letter was written was unknown. Id.
8. Id.

9. Id. at 432. The State also argued at the appellate level that the evidence was
admissible under the doctrine of curative admissibility. Id. at 433. The court of appeals,
however, disagreed. That issue will not be addressed in this Note. Id. at 432-33.
10. Id. at 431. The note read as follows:
Memo
To: George
From: Lisa
Maybe this is the only form you will read-like an office memo. I can't
seem to tell you anything without feeling your anger so I'll try to write down
my feelings.
I am very scared about our marriage and our family. I can't continue
living this way. I'm afraid of you-afraid of your anger and your silencel I
find myself telling the kids not to bother you. I find myself tiptoeing around
the house and I won't do it any more. Life's too short for this garbage. If you
can't talk to me then find someone you can talk to.
Your indecision about your job, our home, everything right now has
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/5
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of the note rather than on hearsay, ruled that the note was admissible to show the
nature of the Revelle marriage at the time of the victim's death." The defense
did not request, and the court did not impose,
a limiting instruction with respect
2
to the purpose of the note's admission.1
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District reversed
Defendant's conviction, holding that the trial court erred in admitting the
victim's letter into evidence because a homicide victim's letter that is "otherwise
inadmissible hearsay cannot be admitted under the state of mind exception as
direct evidence of Defendant's state of mind or a true indication of Defendant's
motive."' 3 Judge Prewitt dissented, noting that the majority failed to explain
why non-hearsay evidence may be used to show a defendant's motive, while
evidence that falls under an exception to the hearsay rule cannot be used in the

nothing to do with me-find out why you're stalling. I don't want a big new
home or a Mercedes or a Highland membership. Ionly want someone who
loves me and accepts me as I am. I need someone who cares what I think and
wants me to be a part of his life. What do you want?
I've often thought that it would be easier if you were having an
affair-at least that would be something tangible I could deal with but I don't
know how to deal with this. I've tried to give you time but nothing happens
and you don't seem to want it to change. You probably don't even believe
anything is wrong.
Just to live in a house together isn't enough. I try to find out about your
work but you give me one or two word replies. When did you ever ask me
about my summer school classes? I want to be a part of your life and maybe
you don't care about mine but at least be honest enough to tell me!
I'm hurt and alone and the kids feel it too. I see Stan shutting down his
feelings too and it makes me sad. Candice is just plain angry and I know she
can feel my pain and your anger.
I will always love you but I won't live with you like this.
Revelle, 957 S.W.2d at 438 n.2.
11. Id. at 435. The trial court itself had a difficult time deciding whether to admit
the note into evidence. At first, the court denied the defendant's request to exclude Lisa's
note. Id. Later, the court decided to exclude the memo, noting that the court would listen
to evidence regarding the timeliness of the memo. Id. Before opening arguments, both
sides presented evidence on the remoteness issue. Id. At this point, the court stated that
remoteness "is the only issue we have concerning the memo." Id. (emphasis added). The
prosecutor responded that it would "forego then the argument about the state of mind and
things of that nature." Id. The court then reversed itself once again and held the letter
was admissible. Id. at 436.
12. Id. at 435.
13. Id. at 433 (Crist, Senior J., writing for the court). Concurring, Judge Shrum
emphasized that the majority did indeed recognize the relevancy of the note, but that the
note was nonetheless inadmissible under the state of mind exception to hearsay. Id. at
434 (Shrum, J.,
concurring). Judge Parrish also filed a short concurring opinion
regarding an issue outside the scope of the this Note. Id. at 437 (Parrish, J., concurring).
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same manner. 14 Judge Garrison similarly filed a dissenting opinion in which he
argued that a homicide victim's statement to a defendant should not be
"summarily dismissed as irrelevant and inadmissible" when the defendant is
aware of the victim's state of mind and that awareness could motivate the
defendant to murder the victim. 5
IlI. LEGAL BACKGROUND

Hearsay-a statement made outside of court that is offered in court to prove6
the truth of the matter stated-is generally inadmissible in a court of law.'
Missouri recognizes, however, several well-established exceptions to the hearsay
rule, including the "present state of mind exception." Generally speaking, a
statement that manifests the declarant's present state of mind is admissible when
relevant, but a statement of the declarant's memory or belief is inadmissible to
prove the fact remembered or believed.'"
There are numerous conditions under which a declarant's state of mind may
be relevant. A homicide victim's present state of mind is traditionally relevant
in three situations. When the defendant of a homicide case raises an issue of(1)
self-defense, (2) accidental killing, or (3) suicide of the decedent, Missouri
courts will usually find that the victim's state of mind may be relevant in
rebutting such defenses. 9 State of mind testimony may be excluded in these

14. Id. at 437 (Prewitt, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 447 (Garrison, J., dissenting).
16. See, e.g., State v. Shum, 866 S.W.2d 447, 457 (Mo. 1993), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 837 (1994).
17.Id. at 458.
18. See, e.g., State v. Boliek, 706 S.W.2d 847, 850 (Mo.) (citing United States v.
Brown, 490 F.2d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1973)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 903 (1986). Two
rationales are used to explain the exception. First, statements reflecting present thoughts
are inherently more reliable than statements made after motives to fabricate arise. See
Amanda Bartlett Mook, Note, The Death of Res Gestae and Other Developments In
MissouriHearsay Law, 60 Mo. L. REv. 991, 997 (1995). Second, given the lack of
alternative means to know a person's thoughts, declarations reflecting such thoughts can
be a crucial tool in the adversarial system. See, e.g., JOHN W. STRONG et al., McCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE § 274, at 481 (4th 1992).
19. See, e.g., Shurn, 866 S.W.2d at 458; State v. Singh, 586 S.W.2d 410,418 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1979). In discussing the present state of mind exception, the District of
Columbia Circuit stated:
When [self-defense] is asserted, a defendant's assertion that the deceased first
attacked him may be rebutted by the extrajudicial declarations of the victim
that he feared the defendant, thus rendering it unlikely that the deceased was
in fact the aggressor in the first instance. Second, where the defendant seeks
to defend on the ground that the deceased committed suicide, evidence that the
victim had made statements inconsistent with a suicidal bent are highly
relevant. A third situation involves a claim of accidental death, where, for
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/5
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cases, however, if the prejudicial effect of the statement outweighs its probative
value. Such is the case, for example, when the victim's statement offered into
evidence is more of a narrative of the defendant's past conduct than a reflection
of the victim's present state of mind.20
While Missouri has not explicitly limited the present state of mind
exception to the above three scenarios,2 it has made its application under other
factual circumstances less certain.' As in the present case, prosecutors will
often attempt to show that at the time of a victim's death, there was either fear
or tension between the victim and the defendant. Such evidence, it is argued,
tends to prove that the defendant had a motive to kill the victim. Missouri courts
generally reject this argument, 2 holding that a victim's state of mind is
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule only when the "declarant's state
'
of mind, in itself,is probative of an ultimate issue in the case."24
An illustration of Missouri's general approach to the present state of mind
5 In Post,the court reversed
exception is found in State v. Post.2
the defendant's
murder conviction because, among other reasons, it was reversible error to allow
into evidence, under the present state of mind exception, statements that his wife
wanted a divorce.26 Accused of drowning his wife, the defendant claimed that
his wife accidentally drowned while he was gone.27 The trial court ruled that the
wife's present state of mind was relevant to rebut the defense that the wife

example, defendant's version of the facts is that the victim picked up
defendant's gun and was accidentally killed while toying with it. In such
cases the deceased's statements of fear as to guns or of defendant himself
(showing he would never go near defendant under any circumstancs) are
relevant in that they tend to rebut this defense.
United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 58, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
20. See, e.g., State v. Benson, 142 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Mo. 1940) (stating that although
the defendant raised the issue of self-defense, it was improper to admit evidence that did
not truly show the state of mind of the victim, but instead was a narration ofpast events);

see also State v. Randolph, 698 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding testimony
that victim said defendant robbed another man and that victim was afraid of defendant
"did not show the victim's state of mind, but instead showed through hearsay his
conversation about appellant's alleged past criminal activities").

21. See, e.g., State v. Singh, 586 S.W.2d 410, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) ("The
factors which make the state of mind of an alleged victim of a homicide relevant are
myriad. However, the courts have developed three rather well-defined categories in

which the relevancy of such statements of fear is established.").
22. See, e.g., State v. Kelley, 953 S.W.2d 73, 86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S.Ct. 1173 (1998); State v. Post, 901 S.W.2d 231, 235-36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995);
Randolph, 698 S.W.2d at 541.
23. See State v. Revelle, 957 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. 901 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).

26. Id. at 237.
27. Id. at 236.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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drowned accidentally. 28 The appellate court, however, rejected this argument
because the defendant claimed that he had nothing to do with her death-not that
he was the one who accidentally drown her.29 Under these facts, the court stated:
"[T]he decedent's particular state of mind that she was unhappy with her
husband [had] no relevance."3'
The Postcourt also noted that the victim's state of mind was irrelevant in
proving that the defendant had motive to kill the victim.3 While this conclusion
alone is not surprising, the way in which the court reached the conclusion sheds
light on this controversial area of the law. The court based its reasoning on the
fact that the state failed to provide any evidence that the defendant was aware
of the victim's desire to divorce the defendant. 2 "In absence of knowledge by
defendant of these intentions, they do not have relevancy and were erroneously
admitted. '33 The Post court strongly implies, therefore, that had the defendant
known of the victim's state of mind (i.e., her intention to divorce), then the
declarations would have been relevant to show defendant's motive and therefore
would have been admissible evidence.34
While there is existing authority in Missouri and elsewhere suggesting that
the admissibility of such evidence does or should hinge upon the defendant's
awarenessof the victim's state of mind,35 this distinction is often overlooked by

28. Id. at 233.
29. Id. at 236.
30. Id. at 233.
31.Id. at 236.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33.Id.
34. Id. Note that six of the seven judges sitting on the Missouri Court of Appeals
for the Southern District found this argument convincing. State v. Revelle, 957 S.W.2d
428, 437, 446 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (Shrum, J., concurring) (Prewitt & Garrison, JJ.,
dissenting).
35. See, e.g., Linton v. State, 880 P. 2d 123, 130 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994) (admitting
testimony that the wife feared her husband and wanted to leave him under the present
state of mind exception to suggest a plausible motive for the defendant's crime), cert.
denied, 517 U.S. 1197 (1996); State v. Robinson, 903 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Haw. 1995)
(holding murder victim's statements that she wanted to get out of the relationship with
defendant, which defendant heard, were relevant evidence that the defendant was aware
of the victim's future intent to leave him if their relationship did not improve; therefore
when the relationship did not improve, defendant had a motive to kill her rather than lose
her); Commonwealth v. Purcell, 673 N.E.2d 53, 54 (Mass, 1996) (admitting testimony
that a murder victim told defendant to leave on the day of the victim's death was
admissible to show both victim's state of mind and the defendant's motive to kill her);
State v. Ivory, 916 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding statements made by
victim to another that he feared the defendant, which led the other to secure assurances
from the defendant that he would not harm the victim, were relevant and admissible at
defendant's murder trial under state of mind exception to the hearsay rule even though
defendant did not plead self-defense, accidental killing or suicide); State v. Post, 901
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/5
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courts. As a result, it is difficult to know how this distinction squares with the
general rule stated by the Revelle court that "otherwise inadmissible hearsay
cannot be admitted under the state of mind exception as direct evidence of
Defendant's state of mind or a true indication of Defendant's motive."3 6 A few
Missouri cases do exist,however, where the victim's state of mind was held to
be relevant and admissible for precisely this purpose.
In 1997, the Missouri Supreme Court held that evidence of a victim's
present state of mind was admissible to prove the defendant's motive for murder.
In State v. Basile,37 the defendant was convicted of killing a husband's wife for
money. 38 The trial court allowed testimony that the victim said her marital
relationship was breaking up and that she was aware of her husband's criminal

S.W.2d 231, 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Payne, 394 S.E.2d 158, 164 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1990) (admitting victim's testimony of her state of mind that she felt her marriage
to the defendant was troubled and that she had related this to the defendant was relevant
to corroborate the defendant's alleged motive, which was to get out of the marriage), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1092 (1991); Commonwealth v. Sneeringer, 668 A.2d 1167, 1171 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1995) (holding murder victim's statement concerning the breakdown of her
and defendant's relationship and victim's express intent to get the defendant out of her
life was relevant to show that she did in fact end the relationship or that the defendant had
a motive to kill her); see also Kelley v. State, 543 So. 2d 286, 287 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989) (holding victim's state of mind was inadmissible because the statements were not
shown to be known by defendant); State v. Weedon, 342 So. 2d 642, 647 (La. 1977)
(holding murder victim's statements to a friend that she wanted to leave her husband, the
defendant, were inadmissible because she did not communicate this desire to him, so
there no possible inferences of any reaction by the husband to such an intention); State
v. Volquardts, 540 So. 2d 497, 500 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (holding victim's state of mind
testimony inadmissible because there was no suggestion that the victim's intent to divorce
the defendant was communicated to the defendant); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation,
Admissibility ofEvidence ofDeclarant'sThen-ExistingMental, Emotional, orPhysical
Condition UnderRule 803(3) of Uniform Rules ofEvidence and SimilarFormulations,

57 A.L.R. 5th 141, 179 (1998), which provides:
[M]any courts have held that evidence of an out-of-court statement by the
victim of a crime that the victim wanted to end a relationship or to divorce the
defendant was admissible... since the statements related to the victim's thenexisting state of mind ....For instance, in the case of one spouse killing the
other, the victim's statement can show that the couple was not getting along
and thus illustrate a possible motive for the defendant's killing ....On the
other hand, some courts have found testimony to the victim's plans to leave
the other spouse inadmissible, such as where the victim's intention was not
communicated to the defendant or where such intent was irrelevant to the
case, such as where it was claimed that the shooting was accidental and it
made no difference whether the victim wanted to leave the defendant.
36. State v. Revelle, 957 S.W.2d 428,433 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
37. 942 S.W.2d 342 (Mo.), cert. denied 118 S.Ct. 213 (1997).
38. Id. at 347.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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activities. 39 Because the defendant failed to properly preserve the hearsay issue
at trial, the Supreme Court held that the trial court properly admitted the
evidence under the "plain error" standard of review because the victim's
"attitude... and knowledge of [her husband's] 4criminal involvement were
relevant to establish [his] motive to murder [her].":
State v. Danforth4 is another case that is arguably an exception to
Missouri's general approach. In Danforth, the Missouri Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction of a 22-year-old wife for conspiring to kill her 75-yearold husband.42 The victim's son testified at trial that after the honeymoon, the
victim said that he "was upset with his new wife because she gave him the run
around" and that if she did not live with him, he would sue her for everything he
gave her.43 The court, in upholding the admissibility of the testimony, noted that
it was
offered by the state, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but
explicitly to show the declarant's state of mind..., a matter which
was relevant here because it corroborated and supported the testimony
of other witnesses that defendant wanted her husband killed...
because she thought if she did not sleep with him that night, he would
cut her out of his will. 4
Even though the court emphasized that the evidence was not used to prove
the truth of the matter stated, it is not clear that the court meant the evidence was
non-hearsay. The reason this is unclear is because the court relied upon State v.
Singh4 in its analysis, a case that explicitly deals with the present state of mind
exception to the hearsay rule.46 Because the court's analysis of admissibility is
so brief, it is difficult to determine if the court intentionally used one theory of

39. Id. at 357.
40. Id. There is no doubt that the reasoning in Basile contradicts the majority of
case law in Missouri. The effect of Basile, however, may be limited by the unusual
circumstances of the case. In the Basile court's brief analysis, it emphasized that the
controversial hearsay implicated the victim's husband and not the defendant who was
paid to kill the victim. Id. "Because the claimed hearsay testimony failed to implicate
the defendant, there was no plain error," Id. Had a more stringent standard of review
applied, or had the statements directly incriminated the appellant, it is doubtful that the
court would have reached the same result.
41. 654 S.W.2d 912 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
42. Id. at 925.
43.Id.
44. Id.
45. 586 S.W.2d 410, 418 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
46. State v. Danforth, 654 S.W.2d 912, 921 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/5
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admissibility while relying on the precedent of a different theory or if the court
was instead simply using the two theories interchangeably. 47
Cases such as the few mentioned above illustrate that Missouri courts are
anything but consistent in articulating why, how, or when the present state of
mind exception is applicable to a victim's statements in a homicide case. This
inconsistency helps explain why the Revelle court struggled so much with the
admissibility of Lisa Revelle's letter.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
In the instant case, the majority of the court found that it was reversible
error to allow into evidence the note that Lisa Revelle wrote to her husband
possibly months before her death.4" In reaching this decision, the court noted
that the parties conceded the note was hearsay and that the State argued it was
an exception to the hearsay rule because it reflected Lisa's present state of
mind. 4 9 In addition to pointing out that the prosecution failed to argue the
testimony was non-hearsay, the majority also emphasized that Defendant did not
raise any of the three defenses that "most commonly"5 make a victim's state of
mind relevant:
[H]ere Defendant denied any involvement in causing his wife's death.
Defendant did not claim self-defense, did not assert that his wife died
by her own hand, did not admit that he was the actor but caused Lisa's
death accidentally, nor didDefendantinject any otherplausibleissue
that would justify an inquiry into the victim Lisa's state of mind.
Given the facts of this case, Lisa's state of mind "as to her belief in the
future of the marriage" and "as to her future relations with [Defendant]
had no relevance."'"
The court rejected the State's argument that the victim's note to Defendant
was relevant, and therefore admissible, because it established Defendant's

47. As with Basile, the extension of Danforth to other cases is at least somewhat
questionable. Left unclear in Danforthis whether the court would have reached the same
holding ifthe statements were explicitly offered under the present state ofmind exception
to the hearsay rule. Also, the court's emphasis on the corroborative nature of the
testimony may also limit the scope of the holding.
48. State v. Revelle, 957 S.W.2d 428, 434 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
49. Id. at 431-32.
50.Id. at 432.
51. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Post, 901 S.W.2d 231,236 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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motive for her death.52 The court relied on cases such as State v. Kelley,s3 State
v. Post,' and State v. Randolph,55 which reject "any notion that the 'present state
ofmind' exception renders hearsay evidence admissible to prove a defendant's
state of mind or motive.,1 6 The reasoning behind this rule, according to the
court, is that "[m]otive concerns the state of mind of Defendant, not that of the
victim."'
Furthermore, "the exception cannot be used to allow hearsay
testimony offered primarily to prove the state of mind of an accused ....
The court conceded that the State is entitled to prove motive in a murder
case and has wide latitude in doing so. 9 But motive, the court noted, "can no
more be proved by inadmissible and objected-to-hearsay than any other fact." 6
Because a victim's present state of mind is inadmissible to prove a Defendant's
state of mind, the court concluded that the victim's letter could not be presented
to the jury to show Defendant's motive to kill. 61 In short, the letter did not fall
within an exception to the hearsay rule and was therefore inadmissible. Because
the erroneous admission of the letter was highly prejudicial to Defendant, the
court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.62
52.Id. at 433.

53. 953 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied 118 S.Ct. 1173 (1998).
54. 901 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. CL App. 1995).
55. 698 S.W.2d 535 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
56. State v. Revelle, 957 S.W.2d 428,433 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
57. Id. The court's reliance on Randolph may be undermined because in Randolph
(1) it was not clear that the state showed evidence that the defendant was aware of the
victim's statements, and (2) the victim's statement was more a narrative of the
defendant's prior bad acts than an account of the victim's present state of mind.
Randolph, 698 S.W.2d at 541.
58. Revelle, 957 S.W.2d at 432.
59.Id. at 433.

60. Id.
61. Id. The court recognized the fact that non-hearsay evidence of marital problems
is probative of a defendant's motive, but reasons that this principle does not apply to this
case because the State conceded that Lisa's note was hearsay. Id. at 434.
62. Id. at 434. Two concurring opinions were filed, but this Note will not discuss
them in detail because they add little to the majority's analysis with respect to the use of
present state of mind evidence to show motive of another. Judge Shrum's concurrence,
joined by Chief Judge Montgomery, Judge Barney and Judge Parrish, emphasized that
the majority did find Lisa's letter to be relevant, contrary to Judge Prewitt's claims. Id.
at 434 (Shrum, J., concurring). The four-judge concurrence noted:
The dissents make a compelling argument that, at least on the issue of motive,
the memo is relevant. If Defendant is retried, Lisa's memo may be admissible
depending on how it is submitted and used. However, as incongruous as that
may seem, this court deals only with the record presented to it.
Id. at 437.
Judge Parrish also filed a concurrence, in which Judge Shrum joined, discussing
issues of curative admissibility, an issue outside the scope of this Note. Id. at 434-37
(Shrum & Parrish, JJ., concurring).
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B. The DissentingOpinions63
Both Judge Prewitt and Judge Garrison stated that the victim's letter fell
under the present state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and that it was
relevant evidence because it was communicated to Defendant and could show
Defendant's motive to kill.6 In other words, Defendant's awareness of the
victim's present state of mind made the letter relevant to a material issue in the
case-Defendant's motive. 65 The letter, the dissenting judges argued, was
therefore correctly admitted into evidence.
Judge Prewitt began his analysis by criticizing the majority for determining
"relevance based on whether the evidence is hearsay."' He explained:
The majority opinion states that evidence of marital problems "is
admissible and is probative of a defendant's intent, motive, or
culpability where proof is by non-hearsay," but does not explain why
evidence that is an exception to the hearsay rule covering the same
subject has different relevancy considerations than non-hearsay
evidence. Obviously, there is no explanation.6'
According to both dissenting judges, the majority wrongly relied on cases
such as State v. Kelley, which state that a victim's declarations cannot be
admitted under the present state of mind exception to the hearsay rule in order
to show the defendant's motive.68 Judge Garrison admitted that he agrees with
Kelley under its facts, but stated that "it is the universal application of the rule
of exclusion announced in Kelley, regardless of circumstances, with which I
cannot agree." 69
Judge Garrison distinguished Kelley and the cases it relied upon for two
reasons. First, the statements in those cases, even if communicated to the
defendant, would not have motivated the defendant to kill. ° Second, and more
importantly, the State in those cases did not even allege that the defendants were
aware of the victim's statements showing the victim's state of mind.7' From

63. Both Judge Prewitt and Judge Garrison filed dissenting opinions. State v.
Revelle, 957 S.W.2d 428,437,446 (Prewitt & Garrison, JJ., dissenting). Because their
views on the application of the present state of mind exception in this case are quite
similar, they will be discussed simultaneously.
64. Id.
65.Id.
66. Id. at 443 (Prewitt, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 446 (Prewitt & Garrison, JJ., dissenting).
69.Id.at 446.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 446-47. Judge Garrison also pointed out that the Post court, upon which
the majority relied, even suggested that had the defendant been aware of the victim's
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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cases such as Kelly, Judge Prewitt and Judge Garrison argued, it does not follow
that a victim's statements are always irrelevant to show a defendant's motive. '
Instead, when the statements are communicated directly to a defendant they may
become highly relevant to prove motive.'
Judge Garrison elaborated on the relevancy analysis by first noting that
evidence establishing a motive to commit a crime for which a defendant is on
trial is relevant.74 To be probative of motive, however, the State must show that
the evidence was known to the defendant.75 Judge Garrison argued "that the
expression of the victim's state of mind is relevant if it was communicated
to the
' 76
defendant and could have provided a motive for the murder.
Applying this analysis to the present case, Judge Garrison argued that the
victim's note was relevant because it "could have been interpreted as evidence
of a moving cause to commit the crime. Whether Mrs. Revelle truly felt that
way is not the crucial question on the matter of motive; rather it is what
Defendant believed."' ' Similarly, Judge Prewitt believed the letter was relevant
to show Defendant's motive because Defendant was obviously aware of the
victim's refusal to "live with [Defendant] like this."78 Therefore, both judges
agreed that the conviction should be affirmed because the trial court properly
admitted the letter as relevant evidence falling under the present state of mind
exception to the hearsay rule. 9
V. COMMENT

The confusing analysis in Revelle makes clear that there is a genuine need
for clarification in hearsay law as Missouri and other jurisdictions continue to
struggle with the present state of mind exception to the hearsay rule in the
context of homicide cases. The majority's application of the present state of
mind exception to this case, while appearing to follow precedent, has some
analytical problems. These problems stem in part from the fact that prior
Missouri case law has never squarely dealt with the issue of relevancy when a
defendant is aware of the evidence indicating the victim's state of mind.
The majority correctly stated that there are three traditional conditions
under which a homicide victim's declarations of state of mind are admissible as
statements, the victim's state of mind would indeed have been relevant to show the
defendant's motive. Id.
72. Id. at 446.
73. Id. at 440 (Prewitt, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 446 (Garrison, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. State v. Revelle, 957 S.W.2d 428, 447 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (Garrison, J.,
dissenting).

77. Id. at 446.
78. Id. at 438 n.2 (Prewitt, J.,
dissenting).
79. Id. at 445, 448 (Prewitt & Garrison, 3R., dissenting).
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an exception to the hearsay rule." These three types of cases justify
admissibility because the relevancy of the testimony almost always outweighs
its prejudicial effect in that the defendant is the one raising the issue of the
victim's state of mind. 1 When, for example, a defendant claims she killed out
of self-defense, the victim's state of mind becomes highly relevant to prove or
rebut the allegation that the victim was the first aggressor.82 In short, the
statements in these cases are relevant to the defendant's chosen defense. 3
Often said in these three types of cases is that the "declarant's state of mind,
in itself, is probative of an ultimate issue in the case."" The Revelle court
seemingly construed this statement to mean that admissibility of a victim's state
of mind testimony always requires the victim's state of mind to be, in itself,
probative of an ultimate issue of the case. 5 Under this rule, however, a victim's
state of mind will arguably be admissible only if the defendant chooses to make
the victim's state of mind part of his or her defense. The Revelle court failed to
explain why such evidence cannot also be used to circumstantially prove a
defendant's motive when the defendant knows the victim's thoughts or
intentions. Nothing in the rules of evidence indicates such a distinction was
intended, necessary, or desirable when applying the present state of mind
exception to the-hearsay rule.
This Note argues that evidence of a victim's present state of mind should
be admissible in homicide cases not only to rebut the three traditional defense
arguments, but also to prove other elements of homicide, including a defendant's
motive, if the statements are otherwise legally relevant. In determining legal
relevancy, the mere fact that a victim's state of mind can never show another's
motive by itself should be of no significance. The important fact is that the
communication of a victim's belief or intent to the defendant creates a whole
new scope of relevancy. In these cases, the victim's state of mind becomes a
link in the chain of proving the defendant's motive. Once the defendant is aware
of the victim's state of mind, that awareness can make it more or less probable
that the defendant has motive to react.
Because a defendant's awareness of a victim's state of mind can be
probative of the defendant's motive, the Revelle court illogically limited the use
of the present state of mind exception in homicide cases. This Note argues that
the majority's true concern in Revelle was that the note's prejudicial effect
outweighed its logical relevancy. As stated before, it is this balancing between
relevancy and prejudicial effect that initially established the three common
80.Id. at 432.
81. Id.
82.Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 433. Moreover, "Randolph rejects any notion that the 'present state of
mind' exception renders hearsay evidence admissible to prove a defendant's state of mind
or motive." Id.
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conditions under which state-of-mind testimony is admissible.16 By placing a
blanket prohibition on evidence of a victim's state of mind to prove a
defendant's motive, the Revelle court failed to account for the fact that when a
victim communicates his or her state of mind to a defendant, the possible
relevancy of the victim's state of mind broadens. Because the potential
relevancy increases, a stronger prejudicial effect must be shown to keep the
evidence out. This determination, however, must be made on a case-by-case
basis.
In the Revelle case, all parties conceded the note written by the victim
conveyed her state of mind. 7 Because it was presented to show her beliefs and
intentions and not the underlying things believed, the note clearly fell within the
present state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. Once the evidence met this
threshold requirement, then its relevancy had to be shown.
The victim's note in Revelle had logical relevancy because Defendant read
the note and, therefore, knew of his wife's feelings of dissatisfaction and refusal
to keep living under the then-existing conditions of their marriage." Knowing
his wife might ruin his reputation by breaking their picture-perfect lifestyle by
exposing the secrets of their distraught marriage and his scandalous
embezzlement, it was more likely that Defendant had a motive to silence her
before she acted first. Defendant would also have a motive to collect on his
wife's life insurance policy before she divorced him. If from her letter he
thought divorce was soon approaching, then Defendant-had a moving cause to
end her life while they were still married. All of these factors make the note
logically relevant because they make it more probable that Defendant had a
motive to kill his wife.
The final step in determining the note's admissibility, however, is whether
the note was legally relevant, that is, whether its prejudicial effect substantially
outweighed its logical relevancy.89 In the Revelle case, the note's legal
relevancy is at least questionable. The note was written at an undetermined
time, possibly six months before the victim died." It is not clear, therefore, that
the note's contents reflect the victim's state of mind at the time she was killed.
Perhaps the Defendant helped mend the marriage after reading the victim's note,
and the victim no longer had reason to leave her husband or expose his financial
troubles. Such speculations, of course, are not significant. What is significant
is that the letter's unknown date makes its relevance less certain and, therefore,
it is more likely that its prejudicial effect outweighed any logical relevancy it
otherwise had to Defendant's motive.

86. Id. at 432.
87.Id. at 431.

88.Id. at 438.
89. See FED. RL EvID. 403.
90. State v. Revelle, 957 S.W.2d 428,431 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
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Similarly, the language of the letter may be too ambiguous to determine the
extent the letter would affect Defendant's motive to act against the victim. The
victim wrote that she was suspicious of her husband's business activities, that
she wouldn't live with him "like this" and that "just to live in a house together
isn't enough." 91 Arguably, these statements do not show that Defendant feared
an upcoming divorce or that his wife would expose his previous crimes.
Because the statements were possibly untimely and somewhat vague, they are
less relevant to show Defendant's motive. The statements, therefore, could be
held inadmissible because they were not legally relevant.
As a practical matter, it is likely that some statements in the letter were
legally relevant while others were too prejudicial to be admissible. Whether
the victim's note was legally relevant, however, is an entirely different issue than
the one posed by the Revelle court. The Revelle court instead chose to broadly
state that a victim's state of mind can never be relevant to show a defendant's
motive. This Note argues that the Revelle court should have held that when a
defendant has notice of the victim's state of mind, admissibility of the state-ofmind evidence depends upon its legal relevance, which can only be determined
on a case-by-case basis.
While the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District arguably
abided by precedent the result it reached seems not only illogical, but inefficient
and costly. As the majority noted before it even discussed the victim's letter,
there was sufficient evidence to convict Defendant for the murder.92
Furthermore, four judges agreed not only that the dissent made a strong
argument that the note was relevant to motive, but that upon remand, the note
could possibly be properly admitted on several grounds.93
VI. CONCLUSION
While the present state of mind exception to the hearsay rule is wellestablished in Missouri, its scope and application continues to be muddled by
cases such as Revelle. Although the Revelle majority followed language from
prior cases, those cases dealt with distinguishable fact patterns. This misguided
application of law to facts resulted in a rule that makes little logical or legal
sense. Indeed, four of the seven judges appeared to recognize the flawed result,
conceding that a victim's present state of mind should be admissible when the
defendant is aware of that evidence and the evidence
makes it more probable
94
that the defendant had a motive to kill the victim.
This case may be much ado about nothing in a narrow sense because there
will probably be sufficient evidence to convict Defendant upon remand-with

91. Id. at 438 n.2 (Prewitt, J., dissenting).
92.Id. at 430.
93. Id. at 437 (Shrum, J., concurring).
94. Id.
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or without the admission of the victim's letter. Furthermore, Missouri appears
to be on the brink of adopting a residual hearsay exception. 9s If courts such as
Revelle continue to force illogical restrictions on established hearsay exceptions,
the residual clause will give litigants an alternative avenue to get otherwise
trustworthy evidence admitted. In a broader sense, however, this case
exemplifies why Missouri should affirmatively acknowledge that a victim's state
of mind can be relevant to prove a defendant's motive when the defendant is
aware of that victim's state of mind.
ROBYN L. ANDERSON

95. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 950 S.W.2d 482, 485-86 (Mo. 1997) (Limbaugh, J.,
concurring) (recognizing that a majority of the judges sitting on the Supreme Court of
Missouri agreed that Missouri should join the federal courts and 29 other states by
implementing a residual exception to the hearsay rule).
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